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Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use
of Judicial Restraint
By GENE R. NICHOL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Through a series of cases decided early in the last decade,
the United States Supreme Court significantly modernized
the law of standing in the federal courts.1 While these deci-
sions have led to a welcome increase in judicial access, the
cases have necessarily raised article Ill concerns. One of the
most controversial methods employed by the Burger Court to
temper the expansion of standing under the broad injury-in-
fact test has been the development of an autonomous doctrine
of causation.2 Primarily under the leadership of Justice Pow-
ell, the Court has fashioned guidelines to limit the availability
of federal relief for indirectly caused injuries. More specifi-
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A.,
1973 Oklahoma State University;, J.D., 1976, University of Texas.
' United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). For an excellent analysis of these decisions, see Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 450 (1970).
2 The causation requirement has been fashioned largely through a series of cases
beginning with Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 6 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976), all of which are discussed extensively infra. Commentary on this line of cases,
for the most part highly critical, has been spirited. See, L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 3-21 (1978); Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Re-
turn to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 CATH. L. REv. 467 (1976); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72
Nw. L. REV. 69 (1977); Leedes, Mr. Justice Powell's Standing, 11 RICH. L. REv. 269
(1977); Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for
Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERs L. REv. 863 (1977); Tuchnet, The New Law of
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977); Note, Standing:
A Key to Flexible Jurisdiction-The Aftermath of Warth v. Seldin, 9 Sw. U.L. REV.
1247 (1978); Comment, The Impact of Policy on Federal Standing, 45 FORDHAM L.
REv. 515 (1976).
In other areas the retrenchment of standing principles has been more direct. See,
e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); and Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)
(decisions that cast serious doubts on the future viability of citizen suits).
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cally, recent decisions have demanded, in construing article
III, the specific pleading of the chain of causation 3 and a sub-
stantial showing of the likelihood of redressability.4
This article will provide a general analysis of the causa-
tion requirement with a primary focus on the Court's rela-
tively recent emphasis on redressability. The Court's foray
into causation, although properly rooted in concern for the
appropriate role of the federal judiciary under article IlI, es-
sentially has been misguided. The causation decisions, on the
whole, have been characterized by a harsh inconsistency. The
tests employed are too easily manipulated to coincide with the
desire, or lack thereof, to reach the merits of particular cases.
Further, the causation doctrine once again5 embroils the
threshold standing determination too heavily in the merits
and works to undermine the Court's role in protecting indi-
viduals from harm resulting from illegal government activity.
Accordingly, this article will suggest an approach to the causa-
tion standard that maintains a proper concern for the separa-
tion of powers demanded under our constitutional system
while being more reflective of the Supreme Court's tradition
as the ultimate arbiter of federal law.
I. SETTING THE STAGE-THE EXPANSION OF THE: INJURY-IN-
FACT TEST
Certainly one of the most profound strides in the mod-
ernization of standing law occurred in the 1970 decision, Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp.6 Rejecting the somewhat circular legal interest test7 as
3 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro Housing Development, 429 U.S. 262 (1977); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
4 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
5 The legal interest test, which was the precursor to the injury-in-fact standard,
was rejected because it necessarily involved consideration of the merits. See Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
6 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
The legal interest test required the plaintiff to establish injury to a legally pro-
tected interest in order to overcome the standing hurdle. Tennessee Elec. Power Co.
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1938); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
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too strongly implicative of the merits, the Court in Data
Processing established a two-pronged standing inquiry.8 To
achieve access to federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact and
must show that the interest to be protected is arguably within
the zone of interests safeguarded by the statutory or constitu-
tional provision under which relief is sought.9
The liberalized standard 0 of Data Processing was quickly
interpreted to encompass a wide variety of grievances under
the injury-in-fact formulation. Threat of criminal prosecu-
tion,11 economic loss, 2 aesthetic or environmental injury,13
and the abrogation of a variety of social and political rights14
were found to be appropriate bases for standing.
The most expansive implementation of the injury-in-fact
test, however, occurred in a 1973 case, United States v.
SCRAP,1 5 in which the Court recognized the standing of an ad
hoc student group to challenge an Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) railroad rate increase. The plaintiffs in SCRAP
claimed that the tariff increase at issue would cause additional
use of nonrecyclable goods and, therefore, eventually would
divert natural resources out of the locale. Further, the group
claimed that the rate structure would discourage the use of
recyclable materials and consequently would result in "eco-
nomic, recreational and aesthetic harm."16
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart acknowledged
that the Court had been asked to follow an "attenuated line of
causation to the eventual injury"'7  but concluded that
302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
8 397 U.S. at 152-53.
*Id.
10 An excellent contemporaneous review of the Data Processing decision is set
forth in Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 450 (1970).
" See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
12 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
13 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
" See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
In Trafficante, the Supreme Court recognized the loss of "important benefits from
interracial associations" as an adequate demonstration of injury in fact. Id. at 210.
,5 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
16 Id. at 675-76.
17 Id. at 688.
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"neither the fact that the appellees here claimed only a harm
to their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the
Washington area, nor the fact that all those who use those
resources suffered the same harm, deprives them of stand-
ing."18 In a telling footnote, the Court cited with approval
Professor Davis' claim that an "identifiable trifle" is sufficient
to meet the injury-in-fact standard.19
Accordingly, within the short span of three years, the Su-
preme Court had rejected the legal interest test, had inter-
preted injury-in-fact to include a wide variety of harms, and
had characterized the requisite degree of injury as an "identi-
fiable trifle." Further, in SCRAP, the Court recognized an in-
jury of such an indirect nature that a chain of questionable
inferences was required to link the claimed illegality with the
perceived harm.20 It was against this background of expansion
that the United States Supreme Court began to seriously ex-
amine causation.
II. THE Linda- Warth-Eastern Kentucky TRIOoGY: A
CAUSATION DOCTRINE EMERGES
In a series of cases that began with its 1973 decision in
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,21 the Supreme Court outlined a
broad causation requirement that reflects an attempt to curb
the expansion of standing under the injury-in-fact test de-
scribed above. Linda presented a challenge by the mother of
an illegitimate child to the allegedly discriminatory applica-
Is Id. at 687.
1, Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L.
REv. 601, 613 (1968)).
20 The SCRAP plaintiffs sought to challenge an ICC ruling that allowed a 2.5%
surcharge on freight rates. The plaintiffs alleged the following line of causation: the
surcharge would discourage the use of recyclable goods and would promote the use of
new raw materials in competition with scrap; the discouraged use of scrap would in-
crease unwarranted mining, lumbering and other similar efforts, thereby adversely
affecting the environment; and the plaintiffs would suffer the consequences of these
effects through the use of Washington area parks and other local recreational areas.
Curiously, the rate increase was general and may not have affected recyclable goods
differently than nonrecyclable ones. Further, the injury alleged would seem to be
more dependent upon the individual practice of manufacturers than upon the ICC
ruling. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
21 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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tion of a Texas child support statute subjecting to criminal
prosecution any parent who failed to provide support for his
or her children. The statute had been construed by the Texas
courts to apply to married parents only.
Denying standing to pursue an equal protection chal-
lenge, the Court ruled that the requested nondiscriminatory
enforcement would not ensure payment of support.22 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff failed to meet the requirement, stemming
from Massachusetts v. Mellon,23 that she sustain direct injury
as the result of nonenforcement.2 4 The Court concluded that
the claimed injury would not be redressed adequately by a
favorable verdict.25
For a variety of reasons, the decision in Linda was not
seen as the herald of a substantial retreat in judicial access.
First, the opinion was authored by Justice Marshall, generally
a proponent of broad standing principles.26 Second, Linda was
presented in the "unique context of a challenge to a criminal
statute,"27 thus implicating prosecutorial discretion. Third,
and most telling, the decision was handed down approxi-
mately three months before United States v. SCRAP,28 the
Court's most liberal standing decision.
Two years later, however, in Warth v. Seldin,29 Justice
Powell used the directness of injury and redressability strains
present in Linda to fashion an autonomous causation require-
ment and created a formidable obstacle to standing for cases
in which activities of third parties play a significant part in
the accomplishment of effective relief.
In Warth, several groups of plaintiffs were denied stand-
"Id. at 618-19.
23 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
2 410 U.S. at 618.
25 The Court stated: "Thus, if appellant were granted the requested relief, it
would result only in the jailing of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution
will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only
speculative." Id.
2 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 47
(1976) (Marshall, J., concurring); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
27 410 U.S. at 617.
U 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
2 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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ing to challenge allegedly exclusionary zoning ordinances en-
forced by the town of Penfield, New York. The petitioners
claimed that the ordinances purposefully rendered them un-
able to locate suitable housing in Penfield. While assuming
the truth of such allegations, the Court characterized the
standing question as whether the plaintiff had alleged such a
personal stake in the action "as to warrant his invocation of
federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the Court's
remedial powers on his behalf."30 Expanding these remedial
concerns to mandate specific pleading of both causation and
redressability, the majority demanded:
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could
be inferred that, absent the respondent's restrictive zoning
practices, there is a substantial probability that they would
have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if
the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability
of petitioners will be removed. 1
In Warth, the Court reasoned that since the plaintiffs'
ability to live in Penfield was necessarily dependent upon the
willingness of third parties to build low-cost housing, and
since the plaintiffs' exclusion was considered likely to be at-
tributable to the economics of the housing market, affirmative
relief would not "benefit" the petitioners.32 Accordingly, no
sufficient causal relationship existed between the contested
zoning practices and the asserted injury.3
Justice Powell wrote again for the Court in Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.34 In Eastern
Kentucky, several indigents sued the Secretary of the Trea-
sury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,
asserting the illegality of a Revenue Ruling according
favorable tax treatment to non-profit hospitals that offered in-
digents emergency room service only. The plaintiffs claimed
that the ruling, reversing prior IRS decisions that had re-
quired hospitals to treat indigents to the full extent of the
30 422 U.S. at 498-99.
11 Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 507.
- 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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hospitals' financial capability, resulted in the denial of hospi-
tal access to the poor.
Even after assuming that some of the petitioners had
been denied services, the Court determined that it was purely
speculative whether the exercise of the Court's remedial pow-
ers would result in the availability of such treatment.35
Anchoring firmly in article III Warth's mandate that the
plaintiff be able to demonstrate that prospective relief will
"remove the harm,"3 6 the Court stated:
In sum, when a plaintiffs standing is brought into issue the
relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the
claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a
showing, exercise of its powers by a federal court would be
gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. M limitation.
In other words, the "case or controversy" limitation of Art.
I still requires that a federal court act only to redress in-
jury that can be fairly traced to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not injury that results from the independent
actions of some third party.37
Concluding that it was just as plausible that the hospitals in
question would elect to forego favorable tax treatment rather
than shoulder the costs of expanded treatment of indigents,
the Court ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show that
their injuries were likely to be redressed by a favorable
verdict.38
An examination of the Linda- Warth-Eastern Kentucky
trilogy, as well as its more recent progeny,39 reveals the
Court's present theory of the article HI requisites for stand-
ing. Although much more easily stated than applied, the in-
jury-in-fact causation requirement, in capsule form, seems to
demand the following: 1) the plaintiff must demonstrate a dis-
" Id. at 43.
Id. at 45 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).
37 Id. at 38, 41-42.
- Id. at 43, 45.
3' Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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tinct and palpable injury to himself;40 2) although the injury
may be indirect,41 the complaint must indicate that the injury
is fairly traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions;42 and
3) the plaintiff's stake in the controversy must ensure that
injuries claimed will be effectively redressed by a decision
favorable to the plaintiff.43
III. THE INJURY-IN-FACT CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS
A. The "Distinct and Palpable" Injury
The "distinct and palpable injury" requirement is pri-
marily a rephrasing of the injury-in-fact test. The nature of
the injury upon which standing may be based remains broad.
For example, in both Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group44 and Andrus v. Sierra Club,'5 the Court
reiterated its commitment to entertain actions based upon
aesthetic and environmental harms. Further, in Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,' standing was granted based
on the social injuries resulting from racial steering.47 It is clear
that for article III purposes, the "distinct and palpable" lan-
guage does not constitute an automatic bar to an action based
upon an injury shared substantially in equal measure by all or
a large class of citizens.48 If an injury is shared by all or a
large class of persons, however, it appears certain that pru-
40 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
41 See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
42 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977) (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976)).
43 See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
" 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
45 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
46 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
47 Racial steering refers to a real estate sales practice wherein real estate sales
personnel allegedly "steer" prospective home buyers to particular residential areas
according to their race. This practice perpetuates racially segregated neighborhoods.
48 See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 109-15. Thus, the
language in SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686, indicating that the fact that "many persons
shared the same injury ... [does not constitute] sufficient reason," to deny standing
would appear to survive, at least under article I.
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dential limits will weigh heavily against a grant of standing.4 9
Fortunately, this article Il prudential concerns dichotomy
leaves room for Congressional action to permit access to fed-
eral courts based upon an otherwise generalized injury.50
The "distinct and palpable injury" requirement, there-
fore, engenders no serious causation problems in its own right.
The remaining standing guidelines that can be gleaned from
Warth and Eastern Kentucky, however, threaten to substan-
tially limit judicial access when the injury alleged has been
sustained indirectly. The mandate that a plaintiff's injury be
fairly traceable to the defendant's actions and the require-
ment that the injury alleged be adequately redressable by an
affirmative decree merit more extensive consideration.
B. Injury Fairly Traceable To Defendant
The requirement that the plaintiff's injury be the result
of the allegedly illegal or wrongful conduct of the defendant 1
directly injects the causation element into standing analysis.
Chief Justice Burger has characterized the recent causation
cases which require not only demonstration of injury but that
demand also a "fairly traceable causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct" 52 as a "subse-
quent reformulation" of the Baker v. Carr53 "personal stake"5'
" See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 99-100. See also
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
go See, for example, Senate Bill S. 3005, proposed as The Citizens Right to
Standing in Federal Courts Act of 1978, on which hearings were held before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee on August 16 and 23, 1978. The bill, which has not yet been
enacted, was introduced by Senators Metzenbaum, Kennedy and Ribicoff. One of its
provisions bars a federal court from denying standing because: "3000(1)(a) The injury
which plaintiff alleges to have suffered as a result of the defendants conduct is shared
by all or a large class of persons. . . ." The Citizens Right to Standing in Federal
Courts Act of 1978: Joint Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Subcommittee on Citizens
and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1978).
51 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
52 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72
(1978).
53 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"In particular, the Court required that a plaintiff "allege such a personal stake
in the outcome as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
1980-81]
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standard.
On its face, the "fairly traceable" standard is both pre-
dictable and sound. The requirement of injury inherently im-
plies the necessity that the harm in some way be attributable
to the defendant. Accordingly, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group,55 the Court correctly demanded
a showing that the Price-Anderson Act 56 was a substantial
contributing cause of the injuries asserted by the plaintiffs
before allowing the environmental group to contest the consti-
tutionality of the Act.57 Implementation of this aspect of cau-
sality, however, has led to a curious intermingling of article III
analysis and newly-announced rules of specified factual plead-
ing, an association that has been almost universally criticized
by legal scholars.58
The most striking example of the implementation of the
"fairly traceable" analysis, and certainly the most controver-
sial application of the doctrine, occurred in Warth v. Seldin.e
Ruling that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing to at-
tack the allegedly exclusionary zoning scheme of the town of
Penfield, the Court specifically held that "a plaintiff who
seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege
specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged
practices harm him."60 Since the plaintiffs had failed to iden-
tify specific housing that they would either construct or oc-
cupy but for the zoning practices, the Court granted a motion
to dismiss for lack of standing.
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." Id. at 204.
55 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
- 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
57 438 U.S. at 77-78.
"' See L. TRIE, AMERIcAN CONSTrrutoNAL LAW § 3-21 (1978); Broderick, The
Warth Optional Standing Doctrine & Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 CATH. L.
REV. 467 (1976); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. R.v. 69 (1977); Sedler, Standing
and The Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative Reform, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 863 (1977); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Aban-
donment, 62 CORNELL L. Rnv. 663 (1977); Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
HARv. L. REv. 58, 205 (1976); Comment, The Impact of Policy on Federal Standing,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 515 (1976).
39 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
60 Id. at 508.
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This aspect of the Warth decision is troubling for two
reasons. First, as Professor Tribe has demonstrated, the rule
confronts the victims of exclusionary practices with an ironic
Catch 22: the more "successfully exclusionary" the zoning
scheme, the less likely that developers will incur the time and
expense necessary to design particular projects and thus
achieve the essential specificity."' Warth, however, seems to
indicate that if an individual chooses not to undertake a con-
struction project prohibited by a zoning ordinance, he will
have no standing to challenge the ordinance.6 2 Second, Warth
demands, unexplainedly, specificity in pleading that is in-
consistent with the liberal standards appropriate to the inter-
pretation of pleadings under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.6 3
The Court's foray in Warth into the field of constitution-
ally-mandated pleading standards was extended in Eastern
Kentucky.6 4 The indigent plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky had
alleged generally that various hospitals were sufficiently de-
pendent upon favorable tax treatment to force an offering of
services to indigents if the Revenue Ruling in question were
reversed. 5 Notwithstanding the Court's assumption that the
government action encouraged hospitals to provide fewer indi-
gent services, the Court determined that the complaint was
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because it failed to
allege an injury that could be fairly traced to the defendants.66
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-21 (1978).
02 See Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. REv. 69, 74 (1977).
'3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) ("all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substan-
tial justice"); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) ("each averment of a pleading shall be simple,
concise and direct, [and] [n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required").
6' Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
" Id. at 42-43 (1976).
00 Id. at 43, 45. It is noteworthy that the Eastern Ky. district court case pro-
ceeded to the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with the majority's standing analysis, in-
dicated that dismissal on the basis of summary judgment was appropriate since the
plaintiffs had made no factual showing that the hospitals in question were being af-
fected by the ruling. Id. at 54 (Brennan, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, was willing to assume that government action en-
couraged the hospitals to provide fewer services to indigents. Id. at 42-43 n.23. He
nonetheless concluded specifically that the complaint was insufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss. Id. at 46.
1980-81]
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Whether the hospitals' failure to offer the desired medical
treatment was due to the changed Revenue Ruling was
termed, at best, a speculative inference.8
Warth and Eastern Kentucky, therefore, seem to reflect
both a preoccupation with specific pleading and a potential
hostility toward inferences of indirect causation of injury.
Under current pleading rules, plaintiffs generally are given the
benefit of every conceivable reading of their complaint, plus
the benefit of the inferences arising from it, before the com-
plaint is defeated by a motion to dismiss."8 Yet, in the words
of the late Justice Douglas,69 the Warth and Eastern Ken-
tucky majorities appeared to read the complaint and the re-
cord with "antagonistic eyes." Certainly the detailed allega-
tions demanded in Warth had not been required in earlier
land use decisions. 0
Contrary to Justice Brennan's gloomy prediction,7 1 how-
ever, Warth has not resulted in a permanently closed federal
door to exclusionary zoning challenges. In Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro Housing Development Corp.,72 the
Court entertained a challenge to an allegedly exclusionary
zoning scheme; in Arlington Heights, the plaintiff could point
to a specific project it intended to construct, thereby lending
the "essential dimension of specificity" supposedly served by
the pleading requirement.7 8
Additionally, the demanded specificity in pleading has
not been uniformly applied in subsequent cases. In Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,7 4 for example, various plain-
tiffs were allowed to contest the steering practices of the de-
fendants, based upon claimed economic and social harms to
" Id. at 42-43.
See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
70 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
71 422 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
73 Id. at 263 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 221 (1974)).
71 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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the community. No showing was made, nor was one required,
that either specific persons or groups of persons would have
located in the community but for the alleged practices.
Therefore, one hopes the emphasis on specific pleading so
prevalent in Warth and Eastern Kentucky will be given lim-
ited use. Possibly the analysis of these two cases will be lim-
ited primarily to examination of land use restrictions, which
by their nature generate a broad range of consequences and
indirect results. To require plaintiffs, as in Eastern Kentucky,
to plead with specificity the effects of a tax ruling on particu-
lar hospitals in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, effec-
tively sounds a death knell to such actions. Further, such a
skeptical analysis of the allegations of a complaint is unneces-
sary in any event. The Court previously has indicated in re-
sponse to a standing claim based upon allegations of indirect
injury75 that "if these allegations were in fact untrue, then the
appellants should have moved for summary judgment on the
standing issue and demonstrated to the District Court that
the allegations were sham and raised no genuine issue of
fact.,' 76
Only an optimist will assume, however, that injuries as
indirect in nature as those recognized by the Court in
SCRAP 7 7 will provide a basis for standing after Warth and
Eastern Kentucky. Although in the Eastern Kentucky opin-
ion Justice Powell was careful to distinguish rather than to
overrule SCRAP,78 the inferences necessary to move from the
defendants' action to the plaintiffs' injury in both Warth and
Eastern Kentucky were considerably less attenuated than
were those accepted in SCRAP. Admittedly, some limit on
properly cognizable indirect injury may indeed be appropriate
under article Ill if the injury-in-fact test is to remain viable.
Demands for such concrete allegations of fact at the pleading
stage, however, serve no similar article III interest.
75 United States v. SCRAP, 414 U.S. 669 (1973).
71 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973).
7 See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the claims
presented by the plaintiffs in SCRAP.
78 426 U.S. 26, 45 n.25 (1976).
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C. The Redressability Requirement
The third and potentially most troubling aspect of stand-
ing analysis under article III is the Court's requirement that
the plaintiff demonstrate that his claimed injury is adequately
redressable. The redressability standard has been described in
a variety of ways. Most commonly, the Court employs a some-
what relaxed standard, demanding that the plaintiff demon-
strate injury that is likely to be redressed if the requested re-
lief is granted.79 Similarly, Chief Justice Burger has described
the causation cases as demanding no more than a "substantial
likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury.' '8°
Yet in both Warth and Eastern Kentucky, the Court indi-
cated that the plaintiff must "establish that, in fact. . . pro-
spective relief will remove the harm."81 Even these variations
in the language describing the requirement hint at the incon-
sistency of the standard's application.2
The redressability requirement is firmly rooted in the
case or controversy requirement of article III. If there were no
redressability hurdle, federal courts could become embroiled
in purely advisory opinions, effectuating no change in the
plaintiff's status whatsoever. Accordingly, if a plaintiff can
make no showing that an affirmative decision will improve his
position, "exercise of its power by a federal court would be
gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the article III limita-
tion. '83 Redressability analysis is, therefore, keyed to the
"proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a demo-
cratic society."84
" Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
80 438 U.S. 59, 75 (1978).
" Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975). Additionally, in Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 124 n.3 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), the redres-
sability doctrine was characterized as a tool to insure that the plaintiff had a suffi-
cient stake in the controversy to guarantee that the "exercise of the court's remedial
powers is both necessary and sufficient to give him relief." Id.
82 See notes 92-134 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
inconsistent application of the redressability standard.
83 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
84 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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Consequently, consideration of the potential for effective
relief caused the Court to deny standing to the plaintiffs in
Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky. The mother of the ille-
gitimate child in Linda was considered unable to demonstrate
that her injury, the lack of child support, would be removed
by nondiscriminatory enforcement of the statute and by con-
comitant criminal action pursued against the child's father.
Similarly, the majority in Warth was unconvinced that a dec-
laration that Penfield's zoning scheme was unconstitutional
would result in available housing for the plaintiffs, since the
existence of such low cost housing would be dependent upon
both third parties and housing market conditions. Finally, in
Eastern Kentucky, the Court was unwilling to assume that a
judicially ordered change in the requirements for tax-exempt
hospital status would result in actual medical care for the in-
digent plaintiffs.
The requirements that the plaintiff's injury be fairly
traceable to the defendant's action and that the injury sus-
tained be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision consti-
tute the two tests by which the Supreme Court determines
whether a sufficient causal connection exists between the
plaintiff's injury and the alleged illegal activity of the defen-
dant. Certainly a substantial correlation exists between the
concerns for directness of injury and redressability; the less an
injury is traceable to the defendant, the more likely it is that
a decree against him will fail to provide effective relief. De-
spite an occasional confusion of the two doctrines in judicial
opinions, 8 5 both their aims and modes of analysis are distinct.
The interests served by the two tests are divergent. Re-
quiring that an injury be "fairly traceable" to the defendant,
at least as that term has been applied in the specific pleading
analysis of Warth and its progeny, serves not only to examine
whether the defendant caused the injury but also appears to
85 See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's statement in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En-
vironmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978): "The more difficult step in the
standing inquiry is establishing that these injuries 'fairly can be traced to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant,' . . . [or] put otherwise, that the exercise of the
Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries." It is certainly arguable
that the confusion evidenced by the above statement pervaded the standing analysis
in Duke Power.
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be primarily aimed at providing that "essential dimension of
specificity" that informs judicial decision-making."6
The redressability standard, however, is solely attributa-
ble to concern for the appropriate role of the judiciary in a
democratic society. It presents the flip side of Marbury v.
Madison87 the federal judiciary is empowered to pass on the
constitutionality of legislation only when necessary to decide
an active controversy before it, and no such power exists if
judicial action will not affect the controversy.
The divergence between the methods of analysis under
the two standards can best be seen by examining the facts of
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.s3
The plaintiffs in Duke Power contested the constitutionality
of the Price-Anderson Act,89 the statute limiting the potential
liability of private nuclear power companies. To demonstrate
injury in fact, the environmental group alleged a full panoply
of presently existing harms that had resulted from the opera-
tion of a neighboring nuclear power plant, including low-level
radiation and altered water temperatures.00 Whether these in-
juries were "fairly traceable" to the federal government de-
pended upon a showing that the Price-Anderson Act was a
substantial cause of the construction of the nuclear plant in
question. Determining that the legislation was a significant
factor in the development of the private nuclear power indus-
try, the Court ruled that the injuries resulting from operation
of the plant were fairly traceable to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.9 1
Whether the plaintiffs' injuries in Duke Power would
have been effectively redressed by a determination that the
Price-Anderson Act was unconstitutional is quite a different
matter. Assuming, for example, that the nuclear plant in ques-
86 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262
(1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221
(1974)).
" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See notes 135-39 infra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the theory of judicial review espoused in Marbury.
88 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
89 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976).
90 438 U.S. at 73.
91 Id. at 74-78.
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tion was substantially constructed or even operational, it is
not at all clear that the injuries sustained through the opera-
tion of the plant would cease upon the invalidation of the
Price-Anderson Act. Rather than examining whether the stat-
ute was a contributing cause of the plant's construction,
redressability analysis entails considering the probability that
the private power company would shut down an operational
nuclear plant, thereby absorbing the economic loss entailed by
such a closure, if the limitation of liability imposed in the
Price-Anderson Act were removed.
Redressability as an autonomous standing requirement,
therefore, determines those instances in which (assuming that
the plaintiff has sustained a distinct injury that is fairly trace-
able to the defendant) standing should be denied because the
alleged harms may not be removed by a favorable decree. The
remainder of this article will consider the propriety of the
Court's recent applications of the redressability doctrine and
will address the article IlI interests affected by such decisions.
1. The Application of the Redressability
Requirement-Generally
The description of the redressability requirement is cer-
tainly simple enough. As previously indicated,92 article III de-
mands that a plaintiff demonstrate injury which is "likely to
be redressed, '9 3 "substantially likely to be redressed, 94 or
which "will be removed"915 if the requested relief is forthcom-
ing. Similarly, the rationale of the requirement, an appropri-
ate concern for the role of the federal judiciary in a demo-
cratic society, is easily understood. The actual application of
the redressability standard by the Burger Court in the last
five years, however, has been neither sound nor readily com-
92 See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the different
redressability formulas employed by the Court.
13 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977); Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
91 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75
(1978).
91 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
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prehensible. Rather than reflecting a studied delineation of
article III principles, the decisions applying the redressability
requirement appear to be explainable only by the Courts' ulti-
mate desire, or lack thereof, to address the merits of particu-
lar cases.
Concern for redressability as a valid aspect of causation-
analysis necessarily involves the consideration of two polar in-
terests: minimizing friction with other branches of govern-
ment and providing remedies for injuries sustained by plain-
tiffs. To the extent that injury can be only indirectly traced to
the defendant, the possibility that judicial relief will not rem-
edy the alleged harm increases, thereby implicating core arti-
cle III interests. By exercising its power in a gratuitous fash-
ion, a federal court not only wastes its time and assets, but far
more importantly, it runs the risk of declaring void the activi-
ties of other branches of state and federal government, with-
out the necessity engendered by an active case or controversy.
The countermajoritarian friction inherent in a constitutional
democracy is, thereby, needlessly increased.
Weighed against this mandatory concern in applying the
redressability standard, however, is the assumption, necessi-
tated by the threshold standing inquiry, that the plaintiff has
been harmed and that the harm is in some manner traceable
to the defendant. Further, because of the state action require-
ment and the nature of federal question indirect injury claims,
the harm-causing defendant will almost certainly be some
branch of government." For this reason, redressability has
been cast in terms of the likelihood that judicial relief will be
effective rather than defined in absolute fashion.
In examining the likelihood of adequate relief, however,
the Court has been far from consistent.9 7 Not only is it ques-
tionable whether the redressability standards announced in
Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky justify the results in
those cases, but those very standards have been applied dif-
" Litigation between private parties presents very little difficulty in standing
analysis. The main body of "case or controversy" law comes from cases considering
the constitutionality of statutes or the legality of administrative actions.
" See notes 91-132 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
inconsistency in its application of the redressability standard.
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ferently and have even been conveniently ignored in subse-
quent decisions.
The Court found redressability lacking in Linda, for ex-
ample, because the mother of the illegitimate child was not
considered "likely" to have her claimed injury redressed; she
was not "likely" to obtain the desired child support. By enact-
ing a statute calling for child support by married parents,
however, Texas apparently thought that such criminal sanc-
tions would "likely" result in payment. Nonetheless, the
Court in Linda concluded that a ruling declaring discrimina-
tory enforcement of the Texas child support statute unconsti-
tutional would result only in the jailing of the delinquent fa-
ther. Payment of child support in lieu of jail was deemed
"speculative."98 Justice White's point in dissent that he had
"always thought our civilization has assumed that the threat
of penal sanctions had something more than a 'speculative' ef-
fect on a person's conduct" 99 was ignored by the majority.
Similarly, the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky presented
injuries which were deemed unlikely to be redressed. Again, it
was considered "purely speculative" whether the denial of
medical services to indigents was attributable to the amended
Revenue Ruling that accorded favorable tax treatment to hos-
pitals whether or not medical services were provided to indi-
gents. 100 The underlying assumption of the opinion appears to
be that whether individuals and corporations will conform
their activities so as to take advantage of tax incentives is
speculative. Rather, in the Court's language, "it is just as
plausible that the hospitals . . . would elect to forego
favorable tax treatment to avoid the. . . financial drain of an
increase in the level of uncompensated services."101
The Court's conclusion would appear to contradict the
Congressional rationale behind allowing tax advantages only
to charitable hospitals. No doubt the theory for allowing tax
deductions for charitable contributions is that individuals, by
acting to take advantage of such opportunities, ultimately will
99 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
1, Id. at 621.
100 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976).
o Id. at 43.
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relieve the government of a portion of the burden of meeting
public need. 102 Indeed, one might appropriately wonder what
Justice Powell believes to be the reason for Congress' frequent
use of favorable tax treatment, if not the belief that conduct
can effectively be encouraged or discouraged by such
legislation.
The curious aspect of both the Linda and Eastern Ken-
tucky decisions is that the Court's redressability decisions
were in direct contradiction to the legislative intent to en-
courage the desired conduct through changed legal status.
Congress obviously believed that hospitals would alter their
behavior in order to maintain the favored tax status. Texas,
just as obviously, believed that delinquent parents would be
likely to support their children if legal sanctions are imposed.
The plaintiffs in Linda and Eastern Kentucky were denied
standing not because effective relief was not likely, but be-
cause effective relief was not absolutely certain.103 Yet the rel-
evant legislative declarations and the record in each case
clearly demonstrated that adequate relief was probable. Thus
the Supreme Court appears to have misapplied the redres-
sability requirement even in the primary cases in which it was
102 Judge Bazelon discussed the rationale for charitable contribution deductions
in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), stating that "[t]he ratio-
nale for allowing the deduction of charitable contributions has historically been that
by doing so, the Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs
which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the Govern-
ment." Id. at 456.
103 See Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. REv. 69 (1977). Professor Davis strongly
disagrees with the results in Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky:
The reasons for disagreeing with all three cases-Linda, Warth and East-
ern Kentucky-are very strong. In each case the plaintiffs were probably
hurt by the governmental action they sought to challenge, but in each case
proving the causal relation was difficult or impossible. Linda's child was
discriminated against but Linda was denied standing to challenge the dis-
crimination. The Warth plaintiffs wanted low cost housing and the ordi-
nance prohibited such housing; the builders were denied standing even
though they wanted to build the housing the ordinance prohibited. The in-
digents in Eastern Kentucky were denied hospital service but could not
prove that the amended ruling helped influence the denial. In each of the
three cases, the probability that the governmental action caused the harm
was held insufficient for standing. The burden of proving the causation was
too much for any of the plaintiffs.
Id. at 74.
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formulated.
The Warth decision can be similarly criticized for de-
manding certainty, rather than probability, of effective relief.
Not only did a group of plaintiffs actively seek the low-cost
housing prohibited by the ordinance, but also a group of
plaintiff builders wanted to construct the type of housing that
was barred.1" Since the plaintiffs failed to identify specific
housing that would be constructed if the ordinance were
struck down, however, redressability was considered
speculative.
Warth is also troubling on another front. When viewed in
the threshold standing posture, Warth necessarily assumes
that the Penfield ordinance is exclusionary in violation of the
equal protection clause. Standing is denied, however, because
the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they would be able to
obtain housing in Penfield absent the ordinance. Yet even if
that assumption is correct, it takes little cognizance of the fact
that the Penfleld ordinance poses a complete bar to any resi-
dent who desires to seek low-cost housing or to anyone who
seeks to persuade others to construct it in the future. If exclu-
sionary, the Penfield ordinance poses a legal impediment to
the opportunity to obtain housing which is an injury in its
own right.105 Certainly, in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke 06 (discussed extensively below), the Court
considered a legally sanctioned denial of opportunity to be in-
jury in fact.
If the Warth demand for certainty of concrete relief were
carried to extremes, much of equal protection analysis would
be put in jeopardy. Consider, for example, Craig v. Boren,107
1- 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975).
105 See L. TRIBE, AMmucAN CONSTITUTmoNAL LAw, § 3-21 (1978).
Consider, for example, a "zoning" ordinance passed by an exclusive suburb that
barred blacks from residing in the locale. If the facts demonstrated that every resi-
dence in the suburb was valued at over $500,000 and no present residents were willing
to sell, what must a plaintiff demonstrate to achieve standing? Would only a black
plaintiff who could afford a half-million dollar residence and who could produce a
willing seller have the requisite personal stake? If, in the hypothetical, standing were
granted on a showing of something less than absolute certainty of effective relief, it
may be on the basis that a sanctioned exclusion itself carries injury.
08 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
107 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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in which the Court struck down, as contrary to the equal pro-
tection of the law, an Oklahoma statute that allowed eighteen
year-old females to drink intoxicants, while males were re-
quired to be twenty-one years old before being considered of
legal drinking age. Commensurate with Craig's equal protec-
tion analysis, Oklahoma was free to "return to the drawing
board" and require that all drinkers be twenty-one. Such be-
ing the case, were the injuries of the eighteen to twenty year-
old male plaintiffs adequately redressable? One can conclude
that standing is appropriate because the injury is the discrim-
ination, not the unavailability of alcohol, and clearly the dis-
crimination would be redressed by a favorable decision. Yet,
assuming that Penfield's ordinance is discriminatory and,
therefore, deprives low income families of the opportunity to
reside in Penfield, would not an affirmative decree clearly re-
move that injury of discrimination, even if not ensuring the
availability of housing?
Warth's preoccupation with redressability, therefore, is
misplaced. Denial of opportunity is itself a recognizably "dis-
tinct and palpable injury" that would be redressed by an af-
firmative decree. Accordingly, the Court's only inquiry should
have been whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a sufficient
personal stake to escape classification of their claim as a gen-
eralized grievance. No doubt the plaintiffs in Warth carried
that burden.
2. The Inconsistent Application-Subsequently
Unfortunately, a questionable internal logic has not been
the only shortcoming of the Burger Court's causation analysis.
The redressability standard announced in Linda, Warth and
Eastern Kentucky appears to have been applied in a substan-
tially different fashion in subsequent cases in which the Court
may have been more anxious to address the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims.
The next major case in which the Court gave extensive
consideration to the redressability issue was Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.108 As previously in-
108 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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dicated,"1 9 the plaintiffs in Duke Power contested the consti-
tutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, which limits the poten-
tial liability of private nuclear power companies in the event
of catastrophe. In order to establish injury in fact, the plain-
tiffs alleged a variety of present injuries resulting from the op-
eration of a neighboring nuclear plant, including the emission
of low-level radiation and other environmental harms.
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger expressly
determined that the injuries claimed were fairly traceable to
the Price-Anderson Act. The trial court had made extensive
findings based upon both expert testimony and the legislative
history of the Act which demonstrated that a but for causal
relationship existed between the limitation and the construc-
tion of private nuclear facilities.110 The trial court also had
found that the nuclear plant in question was substantially
likely to be neither completed nor operated absent the limita-
tion.""' The Supreme Court concluded that such findings were
not clearly erroneous and determined that the injuries
claimed were substantially likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.112
The trial court findings upon which the Supreme Court
relied, however, primarily outlined a causal connection be-
tween the Price-Anderson limitation and the original decision
by the private sector in general, and Duke Power Company in
particular, to enter the nuclear power industry. Further, in
sustaining the trial court's determination, the Supreme Court
focused on the industry's general unwillingness to commit it-
self to nuclear power absent the limitation.1 3 The analysis set
forth in Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky, however, de-
mands not only a showing that the governmental activity
helped cause the injury but also requires a demonstration that
the requested relief will redress the claimed injury.
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court conveniently ignored
'0 See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain-
tiffs' allegations in Duke Power.
110 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 218 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
"I Id. at 220.
122 438 U.S. 59, 74-78 (1978).
113 Id. at 75-77.
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the fact that the two nuclear plants that were the sources of
the plaintiffs' injuries were already substantially con-
structed.114 No consideration was given by the Court to the
more difficult question of whether, assuming the removal of
the Price-Anderson limitation, Duke Power Company would
decide to let two substantially developed nuclear power plants
sit idle. 115 Only if such a decision were made would the plain-
tiffs' injuries be remedied.
Whether or not the plaintiffs' injuries would be ade-
quately redressed by a favorable decree ultimately would de-
pend solely upon the decision of a third party, Duke Power
Company. Moreover, unlike the third parties upon whom re-
lief was dependent in Linda and Eastern Kentucky, Duke
Power Company apparently would serve its financial interests
by operating the plants even without the limitation and
thereby would perpetuate the injuries to the plaintiffs. In
short, the record and common sense clearly indicated a lack of
redressability.
The result is that the plaintiffs in Linda and Eastern
Kentucky, who were quite likely to have had their injuries ad-
equately redressed, were denied standing, while the Duke
Power plaintiffs, who apparently would have been unaffected
by a favorable decree, were granted standing. The result can
be explained only by the Court's obvious desire to reach the
merits of the Price-Anderson claim and by its equally obvious
hesitancy to entertain the actions in Linda, Warth and East-
ern Kentucky.
The 1979 decision in Orr v. Orr""1 is no easier to reconcile
114 See Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203-04 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
"' The record revealed direct testimony by Duke Power officials that they would
attempt to proceed with the plants even in the absence of Price-Anderson. 438 U.S.
at 77 n.22. Interestingly, the majority in Duke Power made no attempt to rebut the
following statement made by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion:
If Duke decided to proceed with construction despite a declaration of the
statute's unconstitutionality, there would be nothing that the Commission
could do to aid the appellees. Where the prospect of effective relief against
a defendant depends on the actions of a third party, no justiciable contro-
versy exists against that defendant.
Id. at 101.
16 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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with the Court's earlier declarations on redressability. Orr
presented a successful equal protection challenge to an Ala-
bama statutory scheme that allowed the recovery of alimony
against husbands but not against wives. Particularly troubling
for purposes of redressability analysis was the fact that the
alimony obligation at issue was fixed by a prior agreement be-
tween the parties, which appeared to be enforceable under
state law.117
Thus, the majority was forced to acknowledge that "de-
spite the unconstitutionality of the alimony statutes, Mr. Orr
may have a continuing obligation to his former wife based
upon that agreement."1 18 The Court in Orr, however, never
addressed the redressability issue. Rather, the contractual ob-
ligation was examined and rejected as an "independent and
adequate" state ground for the decision since the state tribu-
nal had elected to reach the federal constitutional claim. 119
The fact that the Alabama court addressed only the constitu-
tional issue, and not the contractual agreement, obligated the
Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction despite the existence of
an independent state ground.1 20 But no state court determina-
tion can create article Ill jurisdiction where it does not exist.
If redressability is required under article III as Eastern Ken-
tucky indicates, and if Mr. Orr would sustain an alimony obli-
gation regardless of the outcome of his constitutional claim,
the behavior of the Alabama courts would appear irrelevant.
Curiously, Orr presented an injury that, as reflected by
the record, was unlikely to be redressed. Since the plaintiff's
alimony obligation was enforceable in contract even if the
statute were ruled unconstitutional, the plaintiff probably
would not benefit from an affirmative decree, as required by
Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky. Yet the Court appar-
ently purposely chose to ignore the redressability analysis.1 21
"' Id. at 275.
118 Id.
'l' Id. at 276.
110 See United States Air Lines v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973); Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
"2 Justice Rehnquist raised the redressability issue in dissent, but his remarks
went unanswered by the majority, consisting of Justices Brennan, Marshall, White,
Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens.
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Certainly such diametrically-opposed decisions as East-
ern Kentucky (where the Court strained to apply redres-
sability analysis despite the fact that the standing issues had
not been pressed by either the parties or the courts below)122
and Orr, where the record demonstrated a lack of redres-
sability that the Court chose to ignore, contribute little guid-
ance to federal district judges and also inspire little confi-
dence in the "neutral principles"'2 3 of the Supreme Court's
case or controversy analysis. Moreover, the primary architect
of the causation doctrine, Justice Powell, has not consistently
applied its principles. Not only did Justice Powell join the
majority opinion in Duke Power, but he specifically rejected a
redressability challenge to standing in University of Califor-
nia Regents v. Bakke.'24
Alan Bakke, in his now famous challenge to the affirma-
tive action program of the University of California at Davis
Medical School, was unable to demonstrate that he would
have been accepted to medical school absent the special ad-
missions program for minority students. Accordingly, several
amici suggested, reasonably under Warth and Eastern Ken-
tucky, that Bakke lacked standing because he failed to show
that his injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.
The California Supreme Court had avoided the redressability
hurdle by ruling that since the University had discriminated
against Bakke on the basis of race, the burden of proof shifted
to the University to demonstrate that Bakke would not have
been admitted even if there were no affirmative action
program. 25
Cognizant of his declaration in Warth that a plaintiff
must "establish that, in fact, . . . prospective relief will re-
move the harm,' 12 Justice Powell was unwilling to base
Bakke's standing on a shifted burden of proof. Justice Powell
took the position that:
122 See Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. REV. 69 (1977).
123 For a discussion of neutral principles, see H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961).
.24 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1977).
225 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (Cal. 1977).
126 422 U.S. at 505.
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[E]ven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would
have been admitted in the absence of the special program, it
would not follow that he lacked standing. The constitutional
element of standing is plaintiff's demonstration of any in-
jury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision of his claim.... [T]he trial court found such an
injury, apart from failure to be admitted, in the University's
decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in
the class, simply because of his race .... Hence the consti-
tutional requirements of Art. III were met. The question of
Bakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief.127
Accordingly, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is simply irrec-
oncilable with his opinion in Warth. The plaintiffs in Warth
challenged an ordinance that was assumed to be exclusionary
in purpose. They were denied the opportunity to live in
Penfield in the same way Bakke was denied the opportunity
to compete for all 100 places at Cal-Davis. Yet the Warth
plaintiffs were denied standing because they were unable to
demonstrate that they would have been successful in ob-
taining housing in Penfield even if there were no exclusionary
ordinances.
In Bakke, however, the Court found that the plaintiff sus-
tained injury merely from the act of exclusion, irrespective of
whether he could have achieved entry in his own right. Denial
of opportunity, therefore, constituted injury in fact in Bakke,
but it did not in Warth. One wonders why the question of the
plaintiffs' potential inability to actually obtain adequate hous-
ing in Penfield was not also "merely one of relief. ' 128
Bakke and Warth demonstrate the complicated relation-
ship between redressability and equal protection analysis.12'
127 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14.
228 Id.
12' The interplay between redressability and equal protection analysis is com-
plex. If injury is based solely upon the fact of discriminatory state action, the plain-
tiff's claim comes dangerously close to being a generalized grievance against abstract
government illegality. Yet if injury is measured solely by the successful concrete at-
tainment of the desired result (payment for alimony in Linda, for example, or the
location of housing in Warth), underinclusive equal protection analysis is jeopardized.
Need a plaintiff like the husband in Orr show that if the alimony statute is struck
down, the legislature will not remedy the equal protection violation by imposing ali-
mony obligations on both males and females? Arguably, at least some consideration
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In the equal protection context, not only the redressability is-
sue but also the nature of the injury itself is subject to judicial
manipulation. In Warth, the Court held the injury to be re-
dressed was the actual inability to obtain housing in Penfield,
not the denial of opportunity to live in Penfield. Bakke, how-
ever, had to demonstrate only that his denial of opportunity
was redressable, not that he would have been admitted to
medical school absent the affirmative action program. Accord-
ingly, the potential for abuse, obviously present in the Court's
redressability analysis, is compounded.
The actual application of the redressability standard
demonstrates in concrete terms the distressing inconsistency
in the Court's causation analysis. If, indeed, the Court is
merely examining whether a claimed injury is "likely to be re-
dressed," a strong case can be made that Duke Power, Orr
and Bakke presented more substantial redressability concerns
than did Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky.130 The differ-
ing results in the causation cases, therefore, are not explain-
able by the likelihood of redressability, but rather by the de-
sire to reach the merits in particular cases. Having already
produced one false start in affirmative action, 131 the Court ob-
viously desired to reach the issues presented in Bakke. Simi-
larly, the import of the Price-Anderson Act to the private nu-
clear power industry necessitated a ruling on its
constitutionality, thereby resulting in standing in Duke
Power. Additionally, redressability problems in Orr most
likely were ignored because the case presented a seemingly
appropriate vehicle for the Court to continue to fashion a
body of law on gender-based discrimination.13 2
must be given to discrimination, or the denial of opportunity, as an injury in its own
right. Further, the interplay suggests the undesirability of a rigid redressability
standard.
In Duke Power, the record demonstrated the clear likelihood that the plants
would continue in operation, thus perpetuating the plaintiffs' injuries. The majority
in Orr effectively admitted that the plaintiff's injury was non-redressable and yet pro-
ceeded to the merits. Alan Bakke clearly failed to carry the burden of demonstrating
that he would be admitted to Cal-Davis but for the special admissions program, yet
he was granted standing.
'3' A challenge to a preferred admissions program of the University of Washing-
ton Law School was declared moot in Dufunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
"32 Sex discrimination analysis has certainly been one of the most active areas of
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The undesirability of such ad hoc standing analysis is
readily apparent. Standing analysis is a threshold inquiry in
which clear guidelines are particularly necessary. Eastern
Kentucky reached the Supreme Court before the standing is-
sue was raised seriously. At that point, after two carefully con-
sidered lower court opinions on the merits and approximately
five years of litigation, the entire suit was dismissed. In Duke
Power, the trial judge held a four-day trial on the causation
issue. 3' And yet the Supreme Court appears to have applied,
or refused to apply, causation analysis almost at its whim.
Case or controversy requirements can hardly be characterized
as "passive virtues"''s when they are applied only if they coin-
cide with the Court's emotional reaction to the merits.
IV. REDRESSABILITY - A RECONSIDERATION
The introduction of a redressability requirement is moti-
vated by an appropriate aversion to "gratuitous" exercises of
judicial authority. A purely gratuitous or advisory decision is
inherently inconsistent with the theory of judicial review es-
poused in Marbury v. Madison."3 5 Chief Justice Marshall ar-
gued that the power to consider the constitutionality of legis-
lative enactments flows from the ability, indeed the duty, of
the Court to apply the entire existing body of law (including
interest for the Burger Court. See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
'" Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
"4 The principal cornerstones of the debate concerning the propriety of the use
of avoidance techniques are the exchanges between Professors Bickel and Gunther.
See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROus BRANCH (1962); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expendiency in Judicial Review,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
Certainly noteworthy is Justice Rehnquist's comment made in dissent in Orr v.
Much as Caesar had his Brutus, and Charles The First his Cromwell, Con-
gress and the States have this Court to ensure their legislative acts do not
run afoul of the limitations imposed by the United States Constitution. But
this Court has neither a Brutus nor a Cromwell to impose a similar disci-
pline on it.
440 U.S. at 300 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the Constitution) to active controversies affecting the vital in-
terests of litigants. Conversely, if the injuries of a plaintiff will
remain unaffected by judicial intervention, the power to re-
view the validity of legislation vanishes. To remain consistent
with the founding fathers' repeated rejection of the "Virginia
Plan" embodying a general Counsel of Revision,13 some
redressability analysis is mandated.
Even apart from strict analysis of judicial power, the
avoidance of gratuitous opinions reflects a healthy concern for
judicial deference in a tripartite system of government. The
tensions necessarily resulting from judicial decisions voiding
the acts of co-equal, and more democratic, branches of gov-
ernment obviously should not be encountered needlessly. The
"practical wisdom" of avoiding unnecessary conflict was per-
haps voiced most forcefully by Justice Frankfurter:
Courts do not review issues, especially constitutional issues,
until they have to.... In part, this practice reflects the tra-
dition that courts, having final power, can exercise it most
wisely by restricting themselves to situations in which deci-
sion is necessary. In part, it is founded on the practical wis-
dom of not coming prematurely or needlessly in conflict with
the executive or legislature. 37
It is to the "proper-and properly limited-role of the courts
in a democratic society"1"8 that redressability analysis is
directed.
The appropriate concern for judicial restraint, however, is
but a part of the necessary article III analysis in cases such as
Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky. To reach the redres-
iM See 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 430
(1937).
137 Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 345-48 (1935) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In Ashwander, Justie Brandeis outlined
the methods which are used regularly to avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional
issues. He remarked:
It must be evident to anyone that the power to declare a legislative enact-
ment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human judg-
ment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously
and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility.
Id. at 345.
1 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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sability issue, a plaintiff must first have demonstrated the ex-
istence of distinct and palpable injury that is in some manner
traceable to government action assumed to be illegal. Further,
the redressability cases tend to present complex interrelation-
ships between private and government activity that make dif-
ficult absolute proof that the harm will be removed. Accord-
ingly, the Court must analyze the dangers that a decision will
be merely gratuitous in a context of admitted injury that may
or may not be redressable. Consequently, a number of factors
other than judicial restraint enter the redressability equation.
Certainly one of the primary functions of the federal judi-
ciary is to provide remedies for cognizable injuries sustained
at the hands of the state. Accordingly, when the Court refuses
judicial review because of redressability concerns, it does so at
the peril of abdicating one of its foremost responsibilities to
the American populace. 13  Since the inception of the republic,
it has been a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence
that no substantial right should exist without a corresponding
remedy.140 Consequently, a strong public perception exists
that legal wrongs ultimately will be corrected by the courts.
Denials of standing based upon a perceived lack of
"' Indeed, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), itself suggests the
conflicting interests presented by the redressability cases: "The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection." Id. at 58.
140 Consider, for example, the remarks Senator Kennedy made before the Senate
Judiciary Committee during the hearings on proposed Senate Bill 3005:
Legal rights-whether conferred by the Constitution, by statute, or by judi-
cial interpretation-are meaningless without some means of judicial en-
forcement. Yet, the recent resurgence of standing as a barrier to the main-
tenance of important litigation has created precisely this anomalous
situation: there are indeed rights which the courts have [sic] effectively said
there can be no remedy.
The Citizens Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act of 1978: Joint Hearings
on S. 3005 Before the Subcommittee on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Rem-
edies of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1978) (Statement of Senator Edward
Kennedy).
141 In Warth, Justice Douglas wrote in dissent that "the American dream teaches
that if one reaches high enough and persists there is a forum where justice is dis-
pensed. I would lower the technical barriers and let the courts serve that ancient
need." 422 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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redressability assume a legal right that is in some way being
violated by government action. Concern solely with the need
for restraint, therefore, takes too little cognizance of the judi-
ciary's traditional role as mediator between the other
branches of government and the citizenry. The Court should
be as concerned that all government-imposed injuries actually
receive protection as it is with minimizing friction with other
branches of government. The judicial responsibility to afford
relief to injuries sustained as the result of illegal government
activity argues strongly against the standard of virtual cer-
tainty of effective relief employed in Linda, Warth and East-
ern Kentucky.
Further, the Court's institutional role as a check on the
legislative and executive branches is diminished when the
Court refuses to hear claims based on distinct injury resulting
from government illegality.142 Consistent refusals to review al-
leged government illegality serve to reduce the effectiveness of
the federal judiciary as a tool in our system of checks and bal-
ances. Institutional factors, therefore, similarly weigh against
the adoption of a strict redressability standard.
The unique character of the federal judiciary "to say
what the law is"14 argues against a stringent redressability re-
quirement. No doubt, the Supreme Court has moved away
from the pure legal rights model of Marbury in modern con-
stitutional adjudication. Decisions demanding the busing of
school children, the reapportionment of legislatures and the
overhauling of prisons are only loosely analogous to ordinary
litigation.'" This increase in the scope of Supreme Court deci-
142 Alexander Hamilton described the role of the federal judiciary as a counter-
balance to the illegal activity of other branches of government by stating: "[T]he
firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity
and confining the operation of such [unjust and partial] laws. It not only serves to
moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it oper-
ates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them... "THE FEERALIST No.
78 at 470 (New Am. ed. 1961).
James Madison expressed a similar sentiment "In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 322 (New Am. ed. 1961).
s Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 158 (1803).
See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALn
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sion-making has led to an increased expectation on the part of
the public that the highest court will provide the final answer
on the legality of government action.145 The Court's causation
cases threaten to unduly dampen this healthy public
expectation.
Along with such institutional concerns, the possibility ex-
ists that a strict redressability standard gives insufficient con-
sideration to the fact that standing is being denied because
the claimed government action is merely a contributing,
rather than a necessary, cause of injury. However, at least in
the context of discrimination, the Court has been very intoler-
ant of state contribution to private harm. Reitman v.
Mulkey,14 for example, represents a successful constitutional
challenge to state action encouraging private racial discrimi-
nation. Similarly, in Peterson v. City of Greenville,1 47 one of
the sit-in cases, the Court overturned a variety of trespass
convictions because the state had contributed to the private
decision to discriminate. Chief Justice Warren specifically de-
termined that the convictions could not stand "even assuming
... that the manager would have acted as he did
independently. '148
These opinions can be criticized for stretching the con-
cept of state action to the limit. If, however, the states' "en-
couragement" activities had been challenged in actions for de-
claratory judgments, would standing have been denied
because private individuals might choose to discriminate any-
way? Presumably, the cases demonstrate that at least with re-
gard to racial discrimination, the injury most repugnant to a
free, society, even contributing causation by the state is
intolerable.
Additionally, a strict application of the redressability
standard tends to insulate government action from judicial re-
view in a manner inconsistent with our framework of checks
and balances and the Supreme Court's role as the ultimate
L.J. 1363, 1369 (1973).
'" See A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 14 (1962).
146 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
147 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
,,8 Id. at 248.
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arbiter of federal law. Who will challenge the allegedly dis-
criminatory enforcement of a child support statute, if not the
victims of the discrimination? What hospital will challenge
the Revenue Ruling relaxing requirements for treating indi-
gents? The redressability analysis employed in Linda, Warth
and Eastern Kentucky, demanding a showing that a favorable
decree would "remove the harm," is an undesirably rigid for-
mulation of article III principles.
These factors do not indicate that redressability analysis
should cease. Rather, they demonstrate that concern for gra-
tuitous decision-making cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Possi-
bly, such factors as the role of the judiciary and the under-
standable aversion to governmental contribution to injury
have provoked the inconsistent application of the redres-
sability standard by the Burger Court.
A demand for a strict showing of redressability leaves lit-
tle room for the consideration of other vital interests in judi-
cial decision-making. Undoubtedly, the certainty of relief de-
manded in Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky forecloses
examination of any competing interests.14 9 The decisions in all
three cases arguably left significant federal claims unexam-
ined and, possibly, significant federal rights unremedied.
Nonetheless, the results were believed to be compelled be-
cause of the possibility of ineffective relief.
A. A Suggested Standard of Redressability
Redressability analysis shares few of the concerns
presented by other areas of justiciability analysis. Redres-
sability in no way examines whether a grievance is genera-
lized,15 0 whether issues are presented in an adversarial con-
text,1 51 or whether the dispute is capable of resolution through
the judicial, as opposed to the political, process.152 Nor do the
causation cases lack the "impact of actuality" 15 3 presented by
19 The Revenue Ruling questioned in Eastern Kentucky, for example, appeared
to encourage hospitals to offer fewer services to indigents.
111 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
02 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
"62 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
153 Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1002, 1005
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advisory opinions, or the timeless concerns characteristic of
ripeness 154 and mootness 155 decisions. The only interest weigh-
ing against a grant of standing in the redressability cases is
the article HI aversion to gratuitous decisions.
The branch of justiciability analysis most directly analo-
gous to redressability is mootness. Mootness cases typically
present injuries that were once sufficiently concrete to merit
standing. Further, the full factual development required by
ripeness standards continues to be available to guide a poten-
tially moot decision. Finally, the existence of past injury, plus
the fact that at least one party remains willing to litigate, pro-
vides evidence of the likelihood of effective advocacy in cases
which are potentially moot. Consequently, the sole factor
leading to dismissal of cases determined to be moot is judicial
aversion to gratuitous decision-making. Despite the absence of
a timeliness issue, the redressability standard, therefore, is
designed to serve the same justiciability interests addressed
by the mootness doctrine.
The standards traditionally applied by the Court in
mootness cases, however, evidence a significantly more liberal
approach to access than do the redressability cases described
above. 158 The mootness doctrine encompasses the circum-
stances that destroy the justiciability of claims previously
suitable for judicial review;1 57 article HI demands that a suit
(1924).
M4 See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
,' See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968).
16 Under the mootness doctrine, the timeliness of an alleged controversy is con-
sidered. Obviously, subsequent intervening factors can render a once active contro-
versy moot. Once the matter has been resolved, no case or controversy exists. See,
e.g., A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961); California
v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308 (1893) The "collateral sources" exception to
the mootness doctrine is designed to take cognizance of the "obvious fact of life that
most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences."
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968).
The Court has also recognized an exception to the doctrine if a case is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911). The application of the exception, however, has been far from consis-
tent. Compare Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) with
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
157 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
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stay alive throughout the course of the litigation.5 8 The broad
exception to mootness for cases "capable of repetition, yet
evading review"'159 is obviously keyed to the timeliness factor
inherent in mootness analysis and, therefore has no relevance
to redressability. In a long line of cases, however, the Supreme
Court has recognized that cases carrying potential collateral
legal effects are not moot, and the collateral consequences
doctrine is directly analogous to the redressability analysis.
In Sibron v. State of New York, 160 for example, the Court
refused to declare a case moot merely because the defendant
had completed his jail sentence. Finding the possibility of fu-
ture impeachment for prior crimes a continuing collateral ef-
fect, Chief Justice Warren indicated that "a criminal case is
moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any
collateral consequences will be imposed on the basis of the
challenged conviction."' Similarly, in Benton v. Maryland6 '
the Court reviewed a criminal conviction despite the existence
of concurrent sentences, noting that the "mere possibility of
• . . collateral consequences" renders a controversy justicia-
ble.' 6 3 Conceding that the "possibility may well be remote,"'"
the Court found a collateral effect in the possibility that the
defendant might one day be convicted of another offense in a
state with an habitual criminal statute.
These cases involved criminal trials where article In hur-
dles should obviously be at their lowest. The collateral conse-
quences doctrine, however, has been applied in the civil con-
text as well. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle,'65 for
example, involved a challenge by a group of New Jersey em-
ployers to a state welfare program allowing benefits to workers
engaged in an economic strike. Before the case was tried, how-
ever, the labor dispute was settled and the strike ended. Find-
JURISDICTION § 3533 (1975).
" See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
"' See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973).
160 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
"' Id. at 57.
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
"' Id. at 790.
14 Id. at 790-91.
-65 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
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ing a viable controversy, Justice Blackmun wrote: "[T]he
challenged governmental activity . . . by its continuing and
brooding presence, casts what may well be substantial adverse
effect on the interests of the petitioning parties."16 Addition-
ally, the Court recently ruled that an action brought on behalf
of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named
plaintiff's substantive claim even though class certification
was denied by the trial court.167 Summarizing the flexibility of
the mootness/article III requirement, the Court stated:
"These cases demonstrate the flexible character of the Art. III
mootness doctrine. As has been noted in the past, Art. III jus-
ticiability is not a legal concept with a fixed content or suscep-
tible of scientific verification. . . The justiciability doctrine
[is] one of uncertain and shifting contours." ' ,
The approach in these mootness cases clearly reveals a
willingness to overcome article III barriers if any possibility
exists that the government action in question will have a po-
tential effect on the litigant. Such a flexible approach to case
or controversy analysis in mootness cases, however, is obvi-
ously at odds with the rigid view of the redressability/article
HI standards in Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky. Yet
both doctrines would appear to turn on an evaluation of "the
appropriateness of the issues for decision . . . and the hard-
ship of denying judicial relief."'16 9 The Court's causation cases,
therefore, are not only internally inconsistent but also are in-
compatible with other areas of case or controversy analysis.
For a variety of reasons, a flexible article III standard,
akin to that employed in the mootness cases, is a more appro-
priate tool for examining redressability problems than is the
strict standard applied by the Court in the causation cases. A
relaxed standard provides more room for consideration of the
Court's role as a provider of remedies for government-caused
injury and its position as a check on the illegal acts of other
I Id. at 122. See also Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Wirtz v.
Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968); St. Pierre v. United
States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
167 United States Parold Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
16 Id.
Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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branches of government. Equally important, a lowered redres-
sability threshold requirement reduces the potential that the
standing issue will turn on the Court's view of the merits of
the claim. Accordingly, the distressing inconsistencies appar-
ent in the Court's present causation analysis could be miti-
gated. Further, if redressability demands are lowered, the
problems inherent in defining injury in the equal protection
context, demonstrated by Warth and Bakke, become less im-
portant and, therefore, less subject to abuse.
Instead of seeking to determine whether a plaintiff's in-
jury is "likely to be redressed" or "will be removed," the
mootness cases teach that standing is appropriate if the alleg-
edly illegal government action has any substantial effect on
the plaintiff and if such effect is likely to be remedied by a
favorable decision. As a result, standing should be granted if
a favorable decision would contribute in any significant man-
ner to remedying or preventing the plaintiff's injury1170
1"o Such a standard is similar to the statutory guideline suggested by Senators
Metzenbaum, Kennedy and Ribicoff in the proposed (not enacted) Citizens Right to
Standing Act of 1978, which provides in pertinent part:
§ 3000(1) A court of the United States shall not dismiss an action brought
against the United States or any officer or any agency thereof or against
any State or local governmental entity or officer or agency thereof...
based in whole or part upon an act or omission alleged to be in violation of
the laws or Constitution of the United States, on the ground that the plain-
tiff lacks standing to sue because ....
(c) the injury which plaintiff alleges to have suffered as a result of the
defendant's conduct is not substantially likely to be remedied or prevented
by a determination on the merits in the plaintiff's favor, if such determina-
tion may contribute in significant part to remedying or preventing such
injury.
Congressional Record, S. 3005, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. § 6497 (daily ed.
Apr. 27, 1978) (emphasis added).
If such a statute, or a similar version, were to achieve passage in the Congress,
serious constitutional questions would be presented under the Burger Court's present
redressability analysis. In Eastern Kentucky and Duke Power, the Court made clear
its conclusion that article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate in fact that his injury
is likely to be remedied by a favorable judgment. If the enactment were passed under
section five of the fourteenth amendment as well as under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, complex questions would be presented under Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966). See Nichol, An Examination of Congressional Power Under § 5 of the
14th Amendment, 52 NomE DAmE LAW. 175 (1976). This article suggests, of course,
that the Court reformulate the article III standard.
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Under such a standard, the plaintiff would more readily
be able to prevent government contribution to injury that
may be sustained primarily at the hands of third parties. If a
plaintiff sustains an injury and any aspect of that injury can
be redressed by a favorable decree, the "personal stake" re-
quirement of article III is clearly met. Yet even this relaxed
standard maintains article EI's aversion to purely gratuitous
exercises of judicial power. If a plaintiff is unable to demon-
strate that an affirmative decree would have any effect on the
injuries asserted, standing would be properly denied.
Under such a "contribution" standard, the plaintiffs in
Linda, Warth and Eastern Kentucky clearly would have
achieved standing. No doubt a decision requiring non-discrim-
inatory enforcement of Texas child support statutes would
have contributed in a significant manner to remedying the in-
jury sustained by the plaintiff in Linda. Similarly, favorable
decrees in Warth and Eastern Kentucky would have contrib-
uted significantly to removal of the plaintiffs' injuries in those
cases.
In Bakke, Alan Bakke likely could have survived a stand-
ing challenge absent clear proof that he had no chance to gain
admission to medical school even in the absence of the affirm-
ative action program. Moreover, if Bakke lacked standing on
the basis of such proof, he would have been airing only a gen-
eralized grievance; other plaintiffs with valid standing would
have been available to prosecute the claim.
The plaintiffs in the Duke Power and Orr cases, granted
standing by the Court, would face a significant redressability
hurdle even under a relaxed standard. In Duke Power,
whether a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Price-
Anderson Act would contribute significantly to the removal of
the plaintiffs' presently existing environmental injuries is a
complex factual question not addressed by the Court. Given
the magnitude of potential injuries from a nuclear disaster
presented by the Duke Power plaintiffs, however, standing ar-
guably could be appropriately based on the contingent inju-
ries made noncompensable by the Act. Certainly those inju-
ries would have been redressable. The husband in Orr v. Orr
would have been able to achieve standing under a relaxed
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standard only if the Court were to find that a decision declar-
ing the Alabama alimony statute unconstitutional would con-
tribute substantially to relieving the husband's existing con-
tractual obligations. This determination would appear to turn
on Alabama contract law.
B. Professor Tribe's Standard
Professor Tribe has suggested that an autonomous causa-
tion requirement is neither necessary nor desirable. 17 1 Rather,
in cases presenting causation or redressability problems, he
proposes a repeated application of the injury-in-fact require-
ment. More specifically, Professor Tribe submits that:
[W]here plaintiff claims that defendant's unlawful conduct
has caused a third party to do plaintiff injury, a federal
court need only inquire:
1) whether the third party's conduct would have pro-
vided plaintiff with the basis for a claim of injury in
fact if plaintiff had directly sued the third party; and
2) whether, if defendant had required the third party
to abstain from the conduct to which plaintiff objects,
the third party would be able to show a sufficient in-
jury in fact to justify an action against defendant." 2
Professor Tribe's proposed method of causation analysis,
written without the benefit of Duke Power, takes insufficient
cognizance of the case or controversy requirement. Consider,
for example, a factual situation similar to that presented in
the Duke Power case but cast in its most gratuitous fashion.
Assume that the plaintiffs could prove their injuries were
fairly traceable to the Price-Anderson Act but that the defen-
dants could demonstrate conclusively that the nuclear plants
would continue in operation even if the Price-Anderson Act
were struck down. Such a case clearly would meet Professor
Tribe's standard since: 1) the environmentalists could show
injury in fact; and 2) the nuclear power company obviously
would be harmed if the government ordered closure of the
plant. Despite meeting the Tribe standard, however, any exer-
171 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 3-21 (1978).
172 Id.
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cise of judicial power in such a case would be purely gratui-
tous and in conflict with article III.
Any viable standard of redressability must consider both
sides of the equation. Article I demands an adequate con-
cern for avoiding judicial decrees that have no effect in the
real world. Such concerns for restraint, however, should not
work to abrogate totally the Court's responsibility to remedy
governmentally imposed harms. A redressability standard that
allows standing if a favorable decree would contribute in any
significant manner to remedying the plaintiff's injury ade-
quately serves these competing judicial interests.
CONCLUSION
Standing principles were greatly expanded by a series of
Supreme Court decisions handed down in the early 1970's.
Those cases not only recognized a wide variety of harms under
the injury-in-fact rubric, but also allowed standing to be
based on injuries only indirectly caused by the defendant.
Hoping to square article III concerns with the possible ramifi-
cations of such rulings, the Court fashioned an autonomous
causation requirement in the Linda, Warth and Eastern Ken-
tucky decisions.
The Burger Court's causation analysis demands, apart
from demonstrable injury, that the harms alleged be fairly
traceable to the actions of the defendant. The "fairly tracea-
ble" standard has been applied to require the specific plead-
ing of causation and to limit the range of permissible infer-
ences rising from the allegations of the complaint. Given the
availability of the motion for summary judgment to test the
validity of allegations of causation, the selectively-imposed
pleading requirement poses an unnecessary hurdle to
standing.
The causation cases also require a demonstration that the
plaintiff's injuries are likely to be redressed by a favorable de-
cree. The redressability requirement, however, has been ap-
plied in a distressingly inconsistent fashion. Decisions are
more accurately explained by the Court's view of the merits of
particular actions than by the likelihood of an effective rem-
edy. Further, the redressability standard, as enunciated, de-
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mands too great a demonstration of effective relief, resulting
in the denial of standing to plaintiffs who probably were in-
jured by government action.
This article suggests a reconsideration of the causation
doctrine. To obtain standing under article III, a plaintiff
should be required to demonstrate injury in fact. If the injury
is not directly caused by the defendant, it should be "fairly
traceable" to the defendant's actions. The "fairly traceable"
standard, however, should be given a broad reading similar to
the Court's analysis in United States v. SCRAP;17 3 plaintiffs
should be allowed the ojbportunity to prove causation, yet the
pleading should be "something more than an ingenious aca-
demic exercise in the conceivable. 17 4 If allegations of causa-
tion are indeed untrue, they can be tested on summary
judgment.
Further, to assure compliance with the case or contro-
versy requirement, a plaintiff should be required to demon-
strate that a favorable decision would contribute in a signifi-
cant manner to remedying or preventing the injury alleged. A
relaxed redressability standard would limit the potential for
ad hoc standing analysis by the Court and would offer judicial
relief for plaintiffs who have been injured by allegedly illegal
government activity.
173 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
174 Id. at 688.
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